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et al.: Summary of Discussion of Palay/Galanter Paper Paper
of Discussion of Palay/Galanter
Summary

Professor Palay presented a synopsis of his paper (itself a distillation of
Tournament of Lawyers, by Palay and Marc Galanter), an economic explanation of the growth of law firms and a discussion of some of the problems that
growth had engendered, predicting continued growth and success but offering
an array of possible alternative futures of the large law firm. Although the
commentators and other conference participants-all lawyers of one sort or
another-were willing to discuss specific parts of the Palay presentation,
mostly to confirm or take issue with its descriptive accuracy, they seemed
more interested in the ethical, social, and policy issues flowing from that
presentation and generally from the growth of large firms.
Professor Palay noted that law firms have always been commercial and
that we have always known it. During the subsequent discussion, two largefirm partners differed over the extent to which that had been true, focusing on
the importance of business-getting ability in decisions about hiring and
promotion. One opined that hiring and promotion decisions in big firms have
always included consideration of the business-getting ability of the lawyer,
while the other recollected that when today's senior partners were associates,
all that was expected was that they do excellent work and work hard. Several
others commented on their experiences with large firms, noting that during the
modern era there has been a pronounced shift to a corporate mentality in
which bottom-line profitability is the primary concern. In addition, as is
discussed below, many participants commented on the increased competition
and cost-cutting pressures that have diminished professionalism in large-firm
practice. The general sense of the lawyers at the conference was that the
nature and depth of the commercialism of large firms has changed dramatically
in recent years.
Professor Palay explained one of the key theses of his paper: Large firms
have been successful because they an effective form of organization for
delivering the "comprehensive, continuous, high-quality legal services" needed
by complex businesses.
In addition, according to Palay, large firms have been successful because
they provide the incentives and structure necessary for the sharing of human
capital: lawyers' skills, reputations, and client bases. The chief incentive is
the "promotion-to-partnership tournament." Although one lawyer who is not
a large-firm partner opined that the Palay/Galanter promotion tournament is
a realistic description of the dynamics, Palay himself acknowledged the
correctness of the criticism by one partner that the tournament model is an
oversimplification. Palay noted that more details are presented in Tournament
of Lawyers than in his paper or presentation, but admitted that even the book
is oversimplified.
Professor Palay noted that a byproduct of the partnership tournament has
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been exponential growth in large firms. Others agreed that the tournament is
a cause of the growth of these firms. This exponential growth has been
experienced by large firms since their inception at about the turn of the
century, according to Palay, but until the late 1970s, they grew steadily at an
annual rate of around four percent. After the late 1970s, that growth
accelerated by almost fifty percent, to nearly six percent per year.
From the viewpoint of a partner in a large firm, the growth seems to have
come since the 1960s, with firms (except for the huge New York firms like
Cravath) having maintained a 1:1 associate/partner ratio prior to that. Others
commented that several factors other than the partnership tournament explain
the growth in recent years. Change in the nature of the legal services
demanded by large business organizations is an additional cause, an example
being mergers involving a large number of specialists working together
(although this does reflect Palay's concept of shared human capital). This
mergers-and-acquisitions boom occurred during a fairly short period-the "blip
of the eighties"-and is now over. In addition, some of the phenomena of
recent growth, such as growth by acquisition and the development of branch
offices, are not explained by the tournament model.
Professor Palay described a major result of this post-1970s accelerated
exponential growth: a revenue gap-firms' having more people than they can
pay for-that has produced three responses by large firms that are essentially
the "commercialization" that lawyers are bemoaning.
"

First, firms have put on the brakes, slowing their growth by hiring fewer
associates or promoting fewer of them to partner, thus changing their
associate/partner ratios. Some practitioners suggested that the associate/partner ratio is already falling.

"

Second, firms have sought to increase revenues by pushing harder for
business (i.e., more competition for clients and cases). Several partners
noted that it is now common for large-firm partners to make formal
pitches for business, attempting to show their firm's excellence and ability
to meet the client's needs. Additional comments included the prediction
that corporate cost-cutting will increase the degree of competition between
firms and the lament from one large-firm partner that corporate costcutting and competition produce pressures to lower the quality of work
done.

*

Third, firms are making less money, although most firms do not find this
an acceptable solution to the revenue gap.

As a result of the revenue gap, firms have put more pressure on young
lawyers, slighting their training and demanding more hours from them, noted
one partner. Likewise, corporate clients are unwilling to pay for junior
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/10
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attorneys' "sitting in" to learn, commented a lawyer with experience in a
corporate legal department. One large-firm partner was nothing new in this
since corporate clients have never expected to pay for lawyer training. To the
extent that training of associates has declined, it becomes more difficult for
firms to continue the tournament that was the basis of their growth. One
suggestion for dealing with the problem of declining training of associates was
to develop a form of apprenticeship with lower starting salaries and firms
absorbing training costs.
Professor Palay warned that one should not confuse the commercialization
of the legal profession and the changes in large law firms occasioned by the
revenue gap caused by the post-1970s accelerated exponential growth with the
general economic downturn of the 1990s, which resulted in a general decrease
in the demand for legal services. This economic downturn and decreased
demand will result in substantial dislocation of senior associates and young
partners, and will have some effect on all partners and on hiring of new
associates. However, the overall effect will be temporary and will not affect
the future of the large law firm. Large firms that are overleveraged (like real
estate developers) are in risk of failing, but that is not a serious risk for other
large firms.
One partner responded that extensive reliance on bank credit to capitalize
a firm causes other problems as well. It may lead to ethical problems, as in
the Finlay, Kumble collapse. It also facilitates the movement of partners
between firms and thus produces instability.
In response to this latter concern, two ethics professors suggested a
reexamination of the prohibition on covenants not to compete, at least for
partners. Allowing such covenants might enhance firm stability and reduce the
reliance on bank capitalization. One lawyer with significant experience in firm
dissolutions and movement of attorneys between firms noted that most lateral
moves are driven by the desire of lawyers with large books of business to
enhance their earnings.
Another major theme was that big firms are not inherently evil. Palay
noted that he is "a great defender of the large law firm." It is natural that
large firms, in this capitalist country, are commercial, commented one
participant. However, a small-firm lawyer questioned why there is a double
standard for large firms and small ones (and sole practitioners). In other
words, why do we think that it is all right for large firms to be nothing but
commercial, but we focus on professionalism when we consider small firms
and sole practitioners? A large-firm partner responded that studies had shown
(at least in Chicago) that sole practitioners were less likely to comply with
ethical norms than were lawyers in large firms. In any case, a large-firm
supporter opined that providing poor people the same kind of legal resources
that large law firms provide corporations is not the best way to counter
unequal access to justice. (This topic was the focus of the morning session on
Judge Frankel's paper.)
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Even the defenders of large firms admitted (in response to charges by the
judges) that large firms foster a litigious society and create a complexity of
legal issues, formidable even for large corporations. From the perspective of
a federal judge, the practices used by large firms in litigating large cases
monopolize some courts. From the perspective of large-firm partners,
however, most of the fault for oppressive litigation practices lies with the
clients who demand it. (The discussion did not resolve the inconsistency of
this assertion with the claim that corporate clients are cutting costs and limiting
the work they will allow the large firms to do). One large-firm partner
suggested that this issue of the relationship of firm size and commercialization
to litigation abuses is ripe for study.
A major dispute, discussed by many in the group, was whether the
problems of large law firms are significant enough to warrant inquiry and
regulation. They are not, according to two large-firm partners. Indeed,
although these problems are of great concern to the lawyers in the firms, they
are not of much concern to most clients, said one of the partners. The other
partner opined that the problems are largely going to be resolved by the
lawyers in the firms and their clients.
A large number of other participants-including partners in large and
small firms, judges, and academics-disagreed, believing that the problems of
large firms pose significant public policy issues. The litigation-abuse issue
discussed above was cited as a reason to study large law firms. An academic
noted that institutional structures are important in shaping values of those in
the institutions. Large-firm partners commented that firms are standard-setters
in the legal profession and in society generally. Judges expressed concern that
large firms are becoming increasingly difficult to regulate. Finally, one ethics
professor postulated that the business needs of the large law firms are a
driving force that determines the content of the ethical rules.
Many participants noted the individual lawyer's loss of autonomy (and,
concomitantly, personal responsibility) in large firms as the firms grew and
became more commercial. Competition and other aspects of the large-firm
phenomenon are resulting in lowering morals. Lawyers are losing their
traditional societal role of drawing the line for clients between legal and illegal
conduct, a judge noted. As large law firms develop symbiotic relationships
with their large corporate clients, they come to view themselves as facilitators
rather than as standard-setters. The savings and loan crisis is a prime
example, although we could go back in history at least as far as the robber
barons, the judge commented. Another judge remarked that it used to be
widely believed that the "morals of the marketplace" did not belong in the
practice of law-the lawyer's morals were higher than that. However, clients
today reject the increasingly widespread lawyers' practice of enhancing
disputes to generate significant fees and magnify firm profits. Clients are
beginning to insist on working things out directly, without the interference of
lawyers and their adversarial mentality. This, of course, echoed the earlierhttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/10
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discussed concerns about the financial needs of large firms (resulting from the
revenue gap caused by the exponential growth produced by the partnership
tournament) being a major cause of litigation abuses and the ensuing societal
costs.
A partner in a large firm lamented the growing practice of clients
engaging in opinion shopping, and others agreed. When placed in the context
of requests for proposals and the developing electronic aftermarket for firms'
prior work, the potential effect on society and the profession deserves
attention. The appearance that large firms are willing to provide whatever
opinion a client desires is most troubling. As was true in the discussion of
litigation abuses, the discussion of opinion shopping evidenced a widely-held
concern about the failure of large firms to set high ethical standards for the
profession and to draw the line between permissible and impermissible
conduct.
One large-firm partner significantly reformulated his prior position that
studying big firms produces a "So what? Who cares?" response, identifying
a number of areas of legitimate inquiry and stating that his real concern was
that the study be focused on important policy issues, not merely the economics
and demographics of the firms. Palay defended his (and Galanter's) study of
the large firm, not on the basis that it had any inherent significance, but on the
basis that it fascinated him.
No one disagreed that conflict-of-interest problems are a proper subject
for public regulation.
Several participants noted that large firms produce some important
benefits to the public and the profession generally. They have the resources
to retrain lawyers when their areas of expertise cease to be needed and they
have had the ethic to do so. They have bankrolled the American Bar
Association and many of its most worthy endeavors. They have dedicated
enormous resources to pro bono issues, claimed one large-firm partner,
although another noted that there seems to be less of this today, especially
since the senior lawyers no longer are setting the example by deep involvement in pro bono and community activities.
The participants at the conference agreed that large firms are experiencing
significant problems today. There is widespread dissatisfaction among many
lawyers in the firms-a deep malaise affecting both younger and older lawyers,
but especially younger lawyers. One partner suggested that this dissatisfaction
may not be unique to large law firms or even to lawyers. Participants
identified many reasons for the malaise in large firms. One cause is increasing
specialization, with lawyers being more technicians than professionals.
Another is intense competition, with the accompanying demand that lawyers
produce business to be considered for partner.
A major cause of large-firm malaise that was exacerbated by the mergersand-acquisitions binge of the eighties is the size of the firms, according to two
large-firm partners. Their huge size produces a number of effects which lead
Published by Scholar Commons, 1993
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to the malaise. It is impossible to maintain a common culture or a collegial
spirit within such a firm. Lawyers do not know many of the hundreds of
partners. This is further exacerbated by having branches in many cities.
Strong client relationships are disappearing, noted a client representative.
Other commenters indicated that this may be true for the firms but not for key
lawyers, who continue to have strong client relationships and to use them as
leverage in dealing with their firms.
Firms extract a tremendous price in the quality of life and the quality of
professional experience of young lawyers, commented one partner.
The participants expressed widespread concern that large firms do a very
poor job in training young lawyers and that cost-cutting pressures from
corporate clients will intensify this. A partner in a medium-sized firm noted
that those firms are constantly receiving resumes from large-firm associates
and young partners who are unhirable because they know too little and are not
worth what they expect to be paid. Their training is very narrow, and their
experience quite superficial. However, a partner in a major firm noted that
although big firms now do a terrible job of training young lawyers, such firms
could be motivated to provide excellent training if the rewards were present.
He suggested that firms need to accept this as one of the diverse incentives in
the partnership tournament.
Another major lament of the participants was the shift from a partnership
mentality to a corporate mentality within large firms. This has taken place
during the careers of current senior lawyers, during the last thirty or forty
years. There is a profound difference in attitudes: now large firms are
essentially profit-making institutions where the bottom line controls.
Formerly, a sharing model predominated among the lawyers in a firm, and the
system created a high degree of professionalism. The managing partner used
to know all of the lawyers in the firm. Now, because only profit counts-the
bottom line is the sole determinant of success-large firms have a new type of
person as managing partner. Although major-firm partners differed about to
what degree selection of partners has always included consideration of their
ability to bring in business, they agreed that ejecting partners would have been
unthinkable a few years ago.
Several participants-academics and large-firm partners-noted the
importance of loss of professional autonomy in large firms due to their
dependence on significant clients. One professor noted that this destroys the
sense of professionalism and undermines the essential basis for our ethical
rules-individual responsibility.
The result is significant difficulty in
regulating ethical behavior within such large firms, attested a judge.
Several participants called on senior partners-the "grey hairs"-to take
a more active leading role rather than merely abdicating to "the productivity
people" and to set a high moral tone as part of the firm culture. Another
partner from a large firm noted that these are very significant questions:
whether the bottom-line approach predominates in firms today and, if so, what
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/10
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its impact is on the delivery of legal services.
The conference discussions also considered the future. Professor Palay
asserted that big firms are not dinosaurs. Others agreed that they will continue
to thrive and grow. Many at the conference seemed to agree with Professor
Palay that large firms will look much the same in the future as they have for
the past century because no other form of organization is as effective in
delivering the comprehensive, continuous, high-quality legal services needed
by complex businesses or in providing the incentives and structure necessary
for the sharing of human capital, including lawyers' skills, reputations, and
client base. Others disagreed, predicting a different future.
Indeed, Palay outlined a number of possible alternatives that he and
Galanter see to the large firm as we now know it. One possible development
is a small number of megafirms, like the Big Six accounting firms. It is
interesting to note, commented one partner, that the Big Six accounting firms
have been a workable organizational form only because their partners accept
the concept that they must retire in their mid-fifties, at the primes of their
careers, to make room for new partners.
Another possibility is networks of law firms. Firms may be much more
loosely organized. Indeed, one participant noted, the ties that bind them are
already becoming looser, with departments being essentially autonomous and
frequently competing among themselves for work being assigned by key
lawyers in the firm. Perhaps the networks will be vertical, connecting multidisciplinary law firms. Perhaps they will be horizontal-networks of multiple
law firms tied together informally or formally but not as partnerships.
Another possible development is boutique law firms-special types of
firms, not merely small law firms. Yet another is the mixed-compensation (or
lifestyle) law firm.
These possible developments are not mutually exclusive, said Professor
Palay, but are likely to all take place to varying degrees. It does seem likely,
however, that however law firms evolve, there will be more subcontracting
and a significant growth of in-house counsel.
Other participants (interestingly, all of them practicing lawyers) forecast
that the partnership tournament will be abandoned or dramatically modified.
One large-firm partner opined that firms will realize that it is irrational to train
a lawyer for seven or eight years and then fire him. Corporate clients, often
through in-house counsel, are unwilling to pay for associates' producing
"tournament-quality" work-"the genuine learning, the ultimate loan document
or the exquisitely crafted brief"-instead insisting on appropriate-quality work
undertaken with an experienced eye. A large-firm partner reported the same
phenomenon. Others speculated what, if any, implications this has for
malpractice standards, suggesting that the standards must become more
sophisticated to take into account the client's desires. With the demise of
financial rewards to the firm for producing the "elusive perfection of
partnership quality work," the incentive lessens to maintain a system that
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drives the production of such work. Commercialization and other powerful
forces acting on the big law firms may cause them to abandon the partnership
tournament. Large firms, except the giants like the Cravath firm or Sullivan
& Cromwell, will abandon the partnership tournament, go back to the earlier
1:1 associate/partner ratio, and prosper, predicted a large-firm partner who
believes that the end of the mergers-and-acquisitions boom of the eighties will
cause most large firms to revert to earlier patterns.
One final theme touched on by the participants was that computers will
dramatically affect the way in which large law firms function-and perhaps
even more the way small firms function-because "computers and technology
are the key" to the future.
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